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Removing Remedies, Removing Rights; TheFuture of 1983 Claimsfor Violations of
the IDEA in the Wake of Gonzaga v. Doe

Removing Remedies, Removing Rights: The Future of
8 1983 Claims for Violations of the IDEA in the Wake of Gonzaga v. Doe
Congress signed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") into law with
the express intent that individuals with disabilities receive a free and appropriate public
education that is designed to meet their individual needs.

' When a child with a disability does

not receive an education in accordance with the provisions of the IDEA, their parents or
guardians may use administrative procedures outlined in the IDEA to ensure that a school
complies with the Act's goals.2 Sometimes, however, merely requiring the school to change its
noncompliant behavior or repay parents the educational costs that they were forced to expend in
the appropriate education of their child is not enough? In circumstances where parents believe
the limited scope of remedies construed to be available under the IDEA is inadequate: the use of
42 U.S.C. 1983 ("5 1983"); among other laws: has garnered special appeal. The courts,

however, have split on the issue of whether 42 U.S.C. $1983 is available to plaintiffs seeking to

'

20 U.S.C. $5 1400-1419 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The IDEA was originally enacted as the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (EHA) Pub. L. No. 94-142,89 Stat. 773 (1975). This Note will refer to PL 94-142
primarily as the IDEA, regardless of the title in use at the time the relevant decision or statute was passed.
20 U.S.C. 5 1415 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
3
See School Committee of Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359,369 (1985) ( a f f i g
that injunctive relief and reimbursement of certain unjustly incurred educational expenses are included within the
broad grant of remedies conferred by Congress.)
4
Seegenerally Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992,1020 (1984). Although not expressing an opinion on the matter,
the Supreme Court noted that, "Courts generally agree [that] damages are.. .available under the EHA only in
exceptional circumstances."
42 U.S.C. $ 1983 is a statutory vehicle that allows plaintiffs whose Constitutional or federal rights are violated to
sue for a remedy in federal court. This Note will hereafter intermittently refer to 42 U.S.C. 1983 as Section 1983.
20 U.S.C. $ 1415 (I) (1994 & Supp V 1999). Congress amended 5 1415 of the IDEA in 1986 to add, ''Nothing in
this chapter shall be construed to restrict or l i t the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the
Constitutioh the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C.A. 5 I2101 et seq.], title V of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. $ 791 et seq.], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities,
except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this
subchapter, the procedures under subsections (0 and (g) of this section shall be exhausted to the same extent as
would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter." Following this amendment, plaintiffs have
sued for remedies that had been held unavailable by alleging concurrent violations of $504 of the Rehabilitation Act
and 42 U.S.C. 1983 among others.
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allege a statutory violation of the

IDEA.^

This Note will explore whether 5 1983 is available under the IDEA and to what extent a

8 influence the current circuit court split on
recent Supreme Court decision, Gonzaga v. ~ o e , may
the issue. Part I provides a brief overview of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and
its nexus with the current controversy over whether a claim for a violation of the IDEA may be
made under 5 1983. Part I1 discusses the various decisions reached by the circuit courts in
addressing this question. Part I11 examines 42 U.S.C.

5 1983 and the treatment it has received by

the Supreme Court up and through its decision in Blessing v. Freestone. Part IV analyzes a
frequently litigated IDEA provision in light of the Supreme Court's $1983 jurisprudence and
concludes that 5 1983 is available to plaintiffs suing for statutory violations of the IDEA. Part V
evaluates the circuit court decisions that have found $1983 to be unavailable and discusses
possible analytical errors these courts may have made in reaching their decisions. Part VI
considers the holdings of the latest 5 1983 Supreme Court case, Gonzaga v. Doe, and the
possible significance this decision may have in directing future decisions regarding the
applicability of 5 1983 for violations of the IDEA. Finally, part VII concludes that, although $
1983 should have been readily perceived by the circuits as available to plaintiffs suing upon
statutory violations of the IDEA prior to Gonzaga, that decision now casts doubt onto this
conclusion.

7

The First, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth,and Eleventh Circuits have implied that plaintiffs may, theoretically, sue
for violations of the IDEA. The Second and Thirds Circuits have explicitly so held, and the Sixth and Eighth
Circuits have implied such a holding should one of several conditions be met. Two Circuits, the Tenth and Fowth,
have rejected the idea that plaintiffs may use $1983 to sue for statutory violations of the IDEA.
536 U.S. 273 (2002).
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I.
A.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act9 (IDEA) seeks to ensure that children
with disabilities receive a f k e and appropriate education,I0 individualized to meet each child's

unique educational needs. Under the IDEA, every student with an eligible disability1' is entitled
to an individualized program of special education1' and related services within the least
restrictive environment1'. These goals are achieved as the result of each state's implementation
of the IDEA in exchange for federal funding. l4
Although every state is now obligated1' to provide a free, appropriate public education

('TAPE') to students within their state who have disabilities, it was the ~ n w i l l i n ~ n e sor
s'~
financial inability1' of states to adequately provide for the educational needs of these students
that originally led to the creation of the IDEA". Prior to the enactment of the IDEAI~in 1975,

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
20 U.S.C. 5 1412 (a)(l)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
" Id. 5 1401 (3)(A)(i).
l 2 Id, 5 1414 (d). The IDEA requires that each student with a disability have in place individualized educational
programming (IEP) that is decided upon, assessed by, and facilitated through an individualized education program
team IEP teams are comprised of the student (if appropriate), the student's parents or guardians, special and regular
educators, a representative fiom the local educational agency, related service personnel, and other persons who have
knowledge or special expertise regarding the child.
'I Id. 5 1412 (a)(5). A child is educated in the least restrictive environment when they are educated to the maximum
extent appropriate with their nondisabled peers. Students may not be segregated and placed in alternate schools,
classes, or settings that are not equally occupied by their nondisabled peers unless education with supplemenmy
aids and supports cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
" ~ dat. 5 1412 (a).
l5 New Mexico Assoc. for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847 (10" Cir. 1982). New Mexico was the
last state to opt to accept federal funding in exchange for implementing IDEA.
l 6 See infra notes 21 and 23 and accompanying text.
"S. REP.NO. 94-168 (1975). reprinted in 1975 U.S.S.C.A.N. 1431. The Senate noted that despite 36 court cases in
the states recognizing the rights of the handicapped to an appropriate education and an effort by the states to comply,
lack of financial resources have prevented states from implementing these various decisions.
See Notes 21 and 23 In]% regarding two court cases that proved pivotal in creating a fluny of litigation that
eventually led to congressional interest in investigating the education of students with disabilities; See generally
Edwin Martin, et al., The Legislative and Litigation History ofSpecial Education, q 1 ) SPECIAL EDUCATION
FOR
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES,
(Spring 1996). available at http://www.futureofchi1dren.org/usr~doc/vol6nol
ART2.pdfz.
19
See supra note 1. The IDEA was originally entitled the Education for All Handicapped Children Act.
lo
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more than half of all children with disabilities had special educational needs which were not
being met." One reason that these educational needs were not met was because state legislation
prevented students with disabilities from attending public schoo~s.~'
Congress, in its findings, noted that over one million such children had not received any
form of public educati~n.'~
Of the children who did attend school, many of the schools they
attended were private, far from home, and at a cost to their parents.23 Seeking to ensure that the
goals they effectuated in the IDEA were safeguarded and made available to each individual
student, Congress incorporated procedural safeguards and impartial due process procedures into
its enactment of the

IDEA.^

To remain eligible for federal funding under the IDEA, a state must provide the Secretary
of Education with an annual plan that details policies and procedures it has effectuated in accord
with the provisions of the

IDEA^'.

One such required procedure is that parents and students

have notice of, and access to, the IDEA'S safeguardsz6Procedural safeguards ensure students a
free and appropriate public education by securing their parents with the right to be an informed
participant27in its development and implementation. Should this right be denied, the procedural
safeguards also provide parents with the opportunity to have this denial impartially reviewed2*

20 U.S.C. 5 1400 (c)(2)(a)-(b)(Supp. V 1999).
See, e.g., Pennsylvania ~ s s o c i a t i kfor Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279,282-83
(1972). Plaintiffs contested a state law that effectively barred children with mental retardation from public
classrooms by requiring that all students possess the mental capacity
. of a five year old prior to being admitted.
2Z 20 U.S.C. 5 1400 (c)(~)(c)(Supp. V 1999).
23
Id. 5 1400 (c)(2)(E); See also Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.,
1972) wherein the Court held that denying plaintiffs, students with disabilities, an equal educational o p p o d t y due
to school budget constraints to he a violation of the 14" Amendment's equal protection clause.
20 U.S.C. $1415 (Supp. V 1999).
"Id. 5 1412 (a).
26 Id. 5 1412 (a)(6).
"Id. 5 1415 (b)(1),(3),(4).
See id. at $5 1415 (e) (Mediation); 1415(f) (impartial due process hearing); 1415(g) (appeal of the impartial due
process hearing), 1415(i)(2)(a civil action); 1415 (k)(6)(A)(i) (manifestation determination hearing).
20

21

"
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and rectified29.
Generally, the IDEA procedural safeguards mandate that parents: (1) be informed of any
possible changes in the identification, evaluation, instruction, and placement of their child3' and
be given the opportunity to participate in individualized educational planning meetings regarding
a n dseek
these changes3'; (2) be able to examine the educational records of their ~ h i l d ; ~ ~ (3)
impartial review of any educational decisions or actions which the parent believes to be a
violation of the

IDEA.^^

In regard to the last of these, the IDEA provides parents and students

the opportunity to seek redress of the IDEA violations in both administrative and judicial
settings.34
Children with disabilities, and their parents, may seek redress for a violation of the IDEA
through a series of steps. First, a parent must be offered the opportunity to settle the dispute via
mediation."

If the parent chooses not to utilize mediation, an impartial due process hearing must

be provided.'6 An impartial due process hearing is an administrative hearing that is cqnducted
by the local educational agency. The decision of the reviewing officer is final unless appealed.
Families and schools have many of the same rights and responsibilities in a due process
proceeding as they would in a civil action. For example, parents may choose to be represented
by legal counsel, require certain persons be present, and cross-examine witness?' Should the due
process hearing conducted by the local educational agency result in a decision that the parent

"Id. at $1415(i)(2)(B)(3); §1415(i)(3)(B); §1415(1)
Mid. at $1415 (b)(3).
Id. at $1415 (b)(l).
32 Id.
" Id. at $1415(f).
%Id. at §1415(1). The right to bring a civil action is conditioned upon the exhaustion of all administrative
rocedures.
Id. at $1415 (e)(Z)(A)(i).
'61d.at $1415(f).
Id. $ 1415 (h)(l)-(2).

''

''
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believes to be incorrect, they may appeal this decision to the state?' An appeal to the state
educational agency results in an impartial review of the record and a second decision either
reversing or affirming the findings of the local educational agency. Should the state again hold
adversely to the parent and student, this decision may be appealed to either a state or district

The safeguards and due process procedure established through the IDEA have allowed
many families to ensure that Congress's goal of providing a free and appropriate education to
students with disabilities is a living reality for their child. An early and continuing problem,
however, is whether parents and students who have been harmed by the local educational
agency's violation of IDEA have adequate remedies available to them under the IDEA. The

IDEA does not speak to the relief that may be found appropriate at the administrative
proceeding. At the judicial level, however, the IDEA specifies that courts may grant "such relief

as the Court determines is appropriate.'*0 An early case examining the appropriateness of one
~ ' decision in Smith and
form of requested relief, attorney's fees, is Smith v. ~ o b i n s o n . The

Congress' response to it forms the heart of the debate as to whether 42 U.S.C.

1983 might be

available to plaintiffs suing for statutory violations of the IDEA.

B.

Smith v. Robinson and the 1986 Amendments to IDEA

Thomas Smith, a child with cerebral palsy, received what was agreed to be a free and
appropriate public education at a day program conducted by a hospital in his hometown. For one
year, the school district partially funded the tuition the program required in order for Thomas to
attend. The following year, however, the school rehsed to provide any financial assistance and

3 8 ~ d§1415(g).
.
39 Id. §1415(i)(2).
40 Id. § 14 15(i)(2)(B)(3).
4 ' 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
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the Smiths began to pursue their due process rights under the IDEA. Four years after their
struggle began, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found for the Smiths and granted injunctive
relief!2
Though gratified by the Court's ruling, the Smiths also wanted to be reimbursed for the
attorney's fees they expended in their four-year struggle to assure Thomas the rights guaranteed
to him under the IDEA. Although the IDEA did not explicitly provide for attomey's fees,
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and section 1988 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did.
Filing in federal Court, the Smiths argued that their claims, though addressed under the IDEA,
were equally actionable and formed a substantial basis for finding a remedy under 5 504 and $
1988. Because both of these statutes allow for attorney's fees, the Smiths argued that the Court
should award attomey's fees in their case. The First Circuit Court denied their claims and the
Smiths appealed.
The United States Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the First Circuit, held that the
Smiths were not entitled to attorney's fees under the IDEA, 5 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, or 5
1988 of the Civil Rights Act. According to the Supreme Court, the IDEA provided the
"exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert an equal protection claim to a publicly
~ ~ comprehensive administrative procedures promulgated under
financed special e d u c a t i ~ n . 'The
the IDEA, according to the Court's opinion, were indicative of Congress' intent that the IDEA
should provide the sole remedy and procedure for addressing complaints such as those presented
in

As a result, the Smiths and other plaintiffs seeking remedies available under statutes

such as 5 504 and 5 1988 who present facts which would allow them relief under the IDEA, were
barred from seeking relief by recourse to any statute other than the IDEA.
42

43

See Smith v. Cumberland School Committee, 703 F.2d 4 (la' Cir. 1983).
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984).

Id.
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On August 5, 1986, Congress passed the Handicapped Children's Protection Act
("HcPA")~~and effectively superseded the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. ~obinson!~
The HCPA amended the procedural safeguards available under the IDEA to include a provision
that allows a court to award attorney's fees!'

In addition, Congress added a separate provision

to clarify that nothing within the procedural safeguards section should be construed as limiting
the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, Title V of the
Rehabilitation Act, or any other Federal statute that seeks to protect the rights of children with
disabilities. The only exception to this rule, the new provision notes, is the requirement that
plaintiffs must first exhaust all administrative procedures before filing a civil action.48 While the

. the second amendment, concerning a
first of these amendments has caused a little stir,4 9 .it is
plaintiffs rights, remedies, and procedures under the Constitution and as established by federal
law, that has caused the largest disagreement among the courts.50
The remedies available under the IDEA have been narrowly construed by the courts.
Attorney's fees, the relief sought in the Smiths' second suit, were initially held unavailable under
the IDEA because the statute did not explicitly provide for them. Under what is termed the
"American Rule," attorney's fees may not be awarded unless they are provided for in the statute
sued upon.51 Other remedies, such as compensatory and punitive damages, have also been

*'46 PUB.L. NO. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986). (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 1415 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).

See, e.g., Fontenot v. Louisiana Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 805 F.2d 1222, 1223 (5th Cir.1986) and
Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748,754 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that Congress effectively overruled the Supreme
Court's decision in Smith v. Robinson).
"20 U.S.C. 5 1415 (i)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1999).
ld. 5 1415 (1).
"See, e.g., Stefan Hudson, ARTICLE: Buckhannon, Special Education Disputes, and Attorneys' Fees: Time for a
Congressional Response Again, 2003 B W Educ. & L. J. 519 (2003).Controversy exists regarding what constitutes
a "prevailing party" to whom fees are awardable as well as to the application of the Supreme Court's holding in
Buckhannon Ed. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't ofHealth & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (U.S. 2001) to litigation
conducted under IDEA.
See Pan I1 infra.
51
See Alyeska Pipeline Sew. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,249 (1975) (describing the American Rule).

"
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widely interpreted as unavailables2under the IDEA'S grant of "appropriate" relief." The lack of
a damages remedy under the IDEA has led many plaintiffs to rely on Congress' second and less
clear provision in HCPA, that nothing within the safeguards section of the IDEA should be
construed as limiting the remedies available to children with disabilities to seek damages outside
of IDEA, or under other federal laws. 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 is one statute that plaintiffs have relied
upon, with results varying by circuit, to receive an award for damages.
11.

Understanding the Split in the Circuits

The circuits are divided as to whether $1983 is available to plaintiffs suing for a violation
of the IDEA. The Second and Third Circuits have explicitly held that $1983 may be used to sue
for violations of the

IDEA.^^ The Tenth and Fourth Circuits, on the other hand, have held that

$1983 is not available to plaintiffs who are claiming a violation of IDEA. The remaining circuits
have implied, but not explicitly held, that $1983 is available in limited circumstances to plaintiffs
suing for violations of the JDEA.~'
The Second and Third Circuits rely upon the HCPA amendment to the IDEA and its
legislative history to find that $1983 is available to plaintiffs alleging violations of IDEA. The
, ~ ~that the mother of a child with disabilities was entitled to
Third circuit, in KB. v. M u t u l ~ held

a suit using $1983 to recover for procedural and substantive violations of the IDEA. The mother
in Matula repeatedly requested that the school evaluate her child for special education services.
The school failed to evaluate the child and, in so doing, failed to further provide him with the
FAPE guaranteed by the IDEA to children with disabilities. Without specifically finding that the
"See, e.g., Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205,1209 (7' Cir. 1981). One of two early cases to fust analyze
$1415 of the IDEA and conclude that it does not permit an award of damages. These early cases establishedjudicial
recedent that damages are not available under the IDEA.
20 USCS 5 1415 (i)(Z)(B) (Supp. V 1999).
"Mr. & Mrs. B. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1987) and W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding 5
1983 to be available to plaintiffs suing for violations of the IDEA).
IS See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
56 67 F.3d 484,493-94 (3d Cir. 1995).
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IDEA conferred the plaintiff with enforceable rights, the Court held that Congress had
specifically sought to allow access to $1983 when it enacted the HCPA in response to the
Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Robinson.
The Tenth and Fourth Circuits have found the reasoning of the Second and Third Circuits
uncompelling. The Tenth Circuit's Sellers v. The School Board of the City of Manassas
exemplifies the reasoning employed by these circuits in holding 5 1983 to be unavailable to
plaintiffs suing for statutory violations of the IDEA."

The Sellers Court relied on four sources

in drawing its conclusion that $1983 was unavailable: (1) the language of the HCPA amendment;

(2) the legislative history; and (3) Pennhurst v. Halderman 's holding that obligations imposed
upon states pursuant to federal spending legislation must be unambiguously stated if they are to
be enforced.
First, the Court held that the 1986 amendment to IDEA did not explicitly preserve a
plaintiffs right to $ 1983.~' Instead, the statute references protecting access to 'other' statutes
that protect the rights of children with disabilities. Reasoning that 5 1983 is a statute of general
enforcement, the Court held that Congress was not refemng to 5 1983 when it enacted HCPA, a
statute that referred, at least in part, to statutes enacted singularly to protect the rights of the
disabled. Second, reviewing the legislative history, the Court found that the senate report which
the plaintiffs relied upon to explicitly preserve use of $1983 could equally be interpreted to
simply preserve a plaintiffs right to sue for Constitutional rather than statutory violations using
$1983.'~ Finally, the Court relied upon Pennhurst v. Halderman to hold that the ambiguous

'' 141 F.3d 524 (lornCir. 1998).
"Id. at 530.
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nature of the 1986 amendment precluded its enforcement against the states.60
Implying that plaintiffs may, theoretically, sue under $1983 for violations of IDEA are
the First, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. Each of these Circuits has limited
a plaintiffs access to $1983 based upon the plaintiff either failing to exhaust the administrative
remedies available to them6' or the fact that they are suing for money damages; a remedy widely
held unavailable under the

IDEA.^^

Theoretically then, it appears that a plaintiff who has

exhausted their administrative remedies in the first case, or is suing for relief other than damages
in the second instance, should be able to use $1983 to sue for a violation of the IDEA.
The reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Charlie F. v. Board of Education of Skokie
School District 68 is representative of the circuits which limit a plaintiffs access to $1983 based

upon whether or not the administrative remedies available under IDEA were appropriately
exhausted.63 The plaintiff, Charlie, was a fourth grade boy who had panic attacks and attention
deficit disorder (ADD). His teacher "invited her pupils to express their complaints about
Charlieand they all too willingly obliged, leading to humiliation, fistfights, mistrust, loss of
confidence and self-esteem, and disruption of Charlie's educational progress.'a

Following

Charlie's move to another school, his parents initiated a suit under $ 1983 for the violation of
Charlie's right to a FAF'E. Seeing as how Charlie was receiving a FAPE at the time the suit was
filed, his parents sought only damages as relief. Since damages were not available under the

60

Id.; Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Haldennan, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) provides that spending clause
legislation, in order to be enforceable against the states, must affirmatively and unambiguously set forth rights and
obligations.
61
See Kate Frazier v. Fairhaven School Committee, 276 F.3d 52 (1" Cir. 2002); Charlie F. v. Board of Education of
Skokie School District, 98 F. 3d 989 (7' Cir. 1996); Robb v. Bethel School District #403,308 F.3d 1047 (9* Cir.
2002); N.B. v. Alachua County School Board, 84 F.3d 1376 (1 1' Cir. 1996).
62
See Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 980 F.2d 382 (6' Cir. 1992); Bradley v.
Arkansas Department of Education, 301 F.3d 952 (8' Cir. 2002).
63 98 F.3d 989 (7' Cir. 1996).
Id. at 990.
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IDEA, his parents claimed that they were exempt from the exhaustion requirement of $1415(1).6'
The Seventh Circuit held that Charlie was not able to sue under $1983 for a violation of
the IDEA without first exhausting the administrative procedures available under the IDEA.
Although injunctive relief may no longer have been appropriate, the Court found that the
administrative procedures available under the IDEA could still provide Charlie with appropriate
relief in the form of school-funded counseling. Conceding that it is conceivable that the services
available under the IDEA might prove less than satisfactory, and that damages in the end, may be
the "only balm,"66 the Court held that this decision still cannot be fairly made without first going
through the administrative procedures available under the

IDEA.^^

The Sixth and the Eighth Circuits, in addition to requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies, have held that

1983 is not viable for those plaintiffs seeking monetary damages. The

Sixth Circuit in CrocRer v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association held that although
$1983 provided the plaintiff with an action that would otherwise have been foreclosed, "[slection
1983 did not provide a right to damages where none existed before."68 Similarly, citing the

analysis in Crocker, the Eighth Circuit in Heidemann v. Rother held that claims based upon
violations of IDEA may not be pursued in a $ 1983 action "because general and punitive
damages for the types of injuries alleged by the plaintiffs are not available under the

IDEA."^^

The different approaches taken by the circuit courts in deciding whether $1983 is
available to plaintiffs suing for violations of IDEA is indicative of the courts' confusion as to
what circumstances require the withdrawal of the $ 1983 remedy. Over the past twenty years the
" 20 U.S.C.
$ 1414(f) (Supp. V 1999) ("except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief
that is also available under this part, the procedures under subsections ( f ) and (g) will be exhausted to the same
extent as would be required had the action been brought under this part.")
66 Charlie F. v. Board of Education of Skokie School District, 98 F.3d 989,993 (1996).

.-.

67 1,i

'* 980 F.2d 382,387 (6'
69

Ci. 1992).
84 F.3d 1021, 1033 (8" Cir. 1996),
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Supreme Court has refined a test to determine when $ 1983 should be made available to
plaintiffs suing for enforcement of their federal statutory rights. Application of this test to the
IDEA appears to resolve the question as to which of the approaches employed by the circuit
courts is the correct one. An examination of the development of the $1983 test is necessary in
making this decision.
111.

42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 has its roots in what is arguably our nation's earliest struggle for equality.
Enacted in 1871 as part of $ 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, $ 1983 was originally created to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause?' In the post-Civil War era in which
$1983 was passed, state officers and courts were either unable or unwilling to stop Afiican
Americans from being deprived of their newly ratified civil rights?'

Congress's enactment of $

1983 provided plaintiffs with a direct federal cause of action while altering "the relationship
between the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights."72 In
allowing plaintiffs a means of bypassing state courts in order to have their federal rights
vindicated, Congress created a means of ensuring that rights created under the Constitution and
federal laws would not be trounced by state entities acting "under color" of state law. 42 U.S.C.
$1983 provides, in relevant part, that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State. ..subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
70 42 Cong. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, (Potomac Publishing Co., Inc, 2003). 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 was titled as an Act "To
enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other purposes."
See also, Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,238 (1972) (describing the origins of 42 U.S.C. 1983.)
71
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,240 (1972) ("state courts were being used to harass and injure individuals,
either because the state courts were powerless to stop the deprivations [of citizens 14' Amendment rights] or were
in league with those who were bent upon abrogation of federally protected rights.")

72 Id.

Page 13 of 44

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.73
Despite its broad aspirations, 42 U.S.C. $1983 retained a relatively dormant status for
decades after its enactment.74It was not until the 1960's that suits under $1983 grew in
popularity. This increase was largely due to two Supreme Court decisions that expanded the
scope of $1983: Monroe v. pape7'and Maine v. T h i b o ~ t o t . ~ ~
Monroe v. Pape, a suit involving unlawful police entry and arrest, expanded the
definition of what it means to act "under color of law." Prior to Monroe this element of $1983
had been defined as to include only those actions in which state actors had violated federal rights
pursuant to official state

In effect, this narrow construction of "under color of law"

allowed state actors to violate federal and Constitutional rights as long as the state had
established a law that prohibited the conduct engaged in. It was irrelevant, under this early
interpretation, that the practice of the state agency may have been contrary to the official policy,
that the law itself may have provided so little in way of remedies as to be ineffective, or that the
law went unenfor~ed.~'Monroe expanded the definition of "under color" to include those
actions in which the state actor violated Constitutional or federal rights while acting contrary to
official state policy. As a result, states were no longer able to claim immunity for actions which
violated federal and Constitutional rights by merely referencing a state statute that prohibited the
behavior engaged in.79
While Monroe enlarged the class of defendants subject to suit under $1983, it was not

42 U.S.C. 1983 (2000).
Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL
JURISDICnON, 6 8.2, (1989).
"365 U.S. 167 (1961).
76 448 U.S. 1, (1980).
77 Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION,
68.3, (1989).
78 Id.
79 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,183 (1961). "It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give
relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be fust sought and refused
before the federal one is invoked."
74
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until the Supreme Court decided Maine v. ThiboutotsOthat plaintiffs could clearly use $1983 to
sue for violation of rights secured under statutes whose primary purpose was other than to
establish civil rights. Lionel Thiboutot, the father of eight children including three from a prior
maniage, sued for violation of his statutory rights as secured under the Social Security Act.
Although legally responsible for all eight children, the Maine Department of Human Services
refused to consider five children in computing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
benefits to which he was entitled." The Supreme Court of Maine found in favor of Thiboutot,
finding that $1983 allows protection from violation of rights secured by the Constitution "and
laws". The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed and held that the clear language of
$1983 protected violations of rights secured under all laws, not simply those secured under civil
rights statutes."
Following the holdings in Monroe and Thiboutot,the door to $1983 litigation appeared,
at first, to have been swung wide. Subsequent Supreme Court cases, however, sought to narrow
the apparent availability of $1983 to enforce any type of federal right." In Golden State Transit
Corp. v.

LOS

~ n ~ e l e sthe
, ' ~Supreme Court clarified that plaintiffs seeking redress under $1983

must claim a violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law. The test for
determining whether a statute gives rise to a federal right, and hence, a plaintiffs valid use of
$1983, has most recently been summarized by the Supreme Court in Blessing v. Freestone:
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit
the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right
assertedly protected by the statute is not so "vague and amorphous" that its
enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute must
U.S.1, (1980).
at 2.
"Id. at 6-7.
83 See Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles; Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority;
Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n; and Suter v. Artist M. as discussed hereafter.
" 493 U.S.103 (1989).
" Id.
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unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. In other words,
the provision giving rise to the asserted ri t must be couched in
mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.

P

If a statute fails to meet a single element of the Blessing test, the statute fails to confer a federal
right that is enforceable under $1983.'~
A statute meeting all of the elements of the Blessing test may still not be enforceable
through $1983, however. If a statute demonstrates, either expressly or implicitly, that Congress
intended to foreclose a plaintiffs use of $1983, it may not be used to enforce the provisions of
the statute. The Supreme Court has found access to $1983 to have been foreclosed in two cases:
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'nS7andSmith v.
~obinson.~~

The plaintiffs in Sea Clammers sought to enforce environmental protection laws against
the defendant Sewerage Authority based upon an implied right of action. The defendant was
alleged to have damaged fishing grounds by dumping raw sewage on the coast of New York and
New Jersey in violation of several environmental protection laws. The Supreme Court, after first
finding that the comprehensive structure and legislative history behind each statute precluded the
implying of a private right of action, examined the statutes, sua sponte, to discern whether a

.
claim might be made under $1983.89 Finding
that each of the statutes contained comprehensive
enforcement mechanisms, the Court held that when "remedial devices provided in a particular
Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to
preclude the remedy of suits under $1983."~'

In dissent, Justices Stevens and Blackmun noted that although the Court may presume
Blessing, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (citations omitted).

" Id at -341

.... -. ...
~

453 U.S. 1 (1981).
88 468 U.S. 992,1011 (1984).
89 453 U.S. 1,19 (1981).
Id. at 20.
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intent by Congress to foreclose remedial avenues other than those specifically provided for in the
statute, this presumption of foreclosure can be rebutted by "express statutory language or clear
Both statutes contain savings clause provisions which
references in the legislative hi~tory."~'
preserve the right of plaintiffs to pursue a remedy provided in any statute or under common law.
While the majority concluded that the savings clause provisions "do not refer at all to a suit for
redress of a violation of these statutes--regardless of the source of the right of action asserted,"92
the dissent concluded that Congress could only have been more clear in its intent to preserve
$1983 had it replaced the words "any statute" with 'L§1983."93

A majority of the Supreme Court in Smith v. Robinson similarly found the
comprehensivenessof the administrative and judicial provisions set forth in IDEA to be
indicative of Congressional intent to foreclose a plaintiffs use of $1983. In Smith, the Court
found that a plaintiff who utilized $1983 would be able to circumvent the careful remedial
~
circumvention, the Court held, would defeat the
procedures set forth in the ~ t a t u t e ?Such
purpose of a large part of the statute and was therefore clearly not an outcome desired by
~ o n g r e s s ?As
~ discussed earlier:6

however, it remains disputed whether Congress intended to

supersede this holding in Smith when it amended 20 U.S.C. $ 1415 to include a savings clause.
The savings clause which Congress added provided that nothing within the procedural
safeguards section of the Act was to be construed as limiting the rights, procedures, and remedies
available under the Constitution, Title V of the Rehabilitation Act, or any other Federal statute
that seeks to protect the rights of children with disabilities.

Id. at 28.
Id. at 19.
93 Id. at 29.
9'

92

%468 U.S.992,1011-12 (1984).
95
%

Id.
See supra Section LB.
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The Supreme Court has not examined the issue of whether an action to remedy a
violation of IDEA can be brought under $1983 since Congress amended the IDEA in 1986. The
uncertainty over whether Congress, in amending the IDEA, sought to assure plaintiffs recourse
to the remedies available through 5 1983 has resulted in a splintering of the federal circuitsg7. As
~,
the Supreme Court has thus far refused to grant certiorari to clear the c o n f ~ s i o na~reexamination of the IDEA'S susceptibility to a $ 1983 claim is appropriate.

N.

Application of the Supreme Court's

5 1983 Test to the IDEA

The analysis of whether a federal statute is susceptible to a cause of action under $1983 is
two fold. First, the provision in question must be determined to confer a federal right upon an
i n d i ~ i d u a l .Second,
~~
if the provision within the statute confers a federal right, it must be
determined whether Congress intended to foreclose access to $1983 by implicit or explicit
means.'00 If the provision both confers a federal right, and Congress has not acted to preclude
the use of $1983, that statute is enforceable through $1983.
The Supreme Court has admonished that "only when the complaint is broken down into
manageable analytic bites can a Court ascertain whether each separate claim satisfies the various
criteria we have set forth for determining whether a federal statute creates right."lOl As a result,
an analysis of whether a provision of IDEA satisfies the first prong of this two-part test requires
examining whether a right is conferred by aparticular provision and not whether the statute as a
whole conveys rights. For purposes of this analysis, I shall examine the most litigated provision
of IDEA: whether IDEA guarantees a free and appropriate public education to individuals with
97

See, supra Note 7 and accompanying text,.
"See, e.g., Sellers by Sellers v. School Bd., 141 F.3d 524 (4&Cir., 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 871 (1998).
99 Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) ("First, the plaintiff must assert the violation
of a federal right.")
IW
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,341 (1997) (discussing how congress may expressly or impliedly foreclose
access to 5 1983).
lo' Id.
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disabilities ("FAPF').
A plaintiff suing for a violation of the IDEA under $ 1983 must assert the violation of a

federal right and demonstrate that the use of $ 1983 has not been either explicitly or implicitly
foreclosed. The Supreme Court summarized the three part inquiry in determining whether a
provision in a statute confers a federal right upon the plaintiff as: (1) whether the provision is
intended to benefit the plaintiff; (2) whether or not the right is so ''vague and amorphous" as to
prevent judicial enforcement; and (3) whether the statute imposes a binding obligation on the
states.

A statutory provision has been found to have been intended to benefit the plaintiff in two
circumstances: when the language of the statute is "phrased in terms of the persons benefited"lo3
and when the "provision in question was intended to benefit the putative plaintiff."1" While the
former requirement has been used to find an implied right of action as well as $1983 claims, the
latter requirement has only been used in determining $1983 claims. The distinction between the
two requirements is subtle and best explained by example.

In Cannon v. University of Chicago the Supreme Court explained that the determination
of whether a provision is intended to benefit the plaintiff depends on whether the statute was
enacted for the benefit of a particular class of which the plaintiff is a member as opposed to the
benefit of the public at large.''* This determination, the Court held, could best be made by
looking to the explicit "rights- or obligation-creating language" of the statute. The Court found
that Title LX's provision that ""[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
Id. at 340-41.
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418,433 (1987), citing Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,692, n. 13 (1979).
10d Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106, (1989).
I05
Cannon v. University of Chicago 441 U.S. 677,690 (1979).
Io2

103
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any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" was clearly enacted to
benefit a particular class of individuals-women.

As a result, the provision was held to have

been intended to benefit the plaintiff.
In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass h,Io6by contrast, the Supreme Court found a provision
of the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act to meet the 51983 requirement that the statute
benefit the plaintiffs. The provision in question required a state plan for medical assistance "to
reimburse providers using rates (determined in accordance with methods and standards
developed by the State ...) which the State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to the
Secretary, are reasonable and adequate....,1107 The state plan requirement, the Supreme Court
noted, was "phrased in terms benefiting health care providers" and therefore met the 91983
requirement.lo8
The dissent in Wilder objected to the fact that the majority "looked beyond the
unambiguous terms of the statute."lo9 Citing the title of the statute, "State plans for medical
assistance," the dissent noted that the requirement that states reimburse providers using
reasonable rates was just one in a series of conditions for receiving funds for medical
assistance.l1° The dissent further found that the "absence in the statute of any express focus on
providers as a beneficiary class of the provision" further buttressed the conclusion that the
providers were not the beneficiaries of the statute."'
The provision of a FAF'E can easily be held to benefit individuals with disabilities under
the requirement posed by the majority in Wilder. More difficult to meet, however, is the dissent's

496 U.S. 498 (1990),
Id. at 502.
I" ~ dat. 510.
IW
Id. at 526.
"Old. at 527.
I"

Im

'I'

Id.
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requirement that the provision possess rights- or obligation-creatinglanguage. Section 1412 (a)
provides that:

"A state is eligible for assistance under this part.. . if the State demonstrates to the
satisfaction of the Secretary that the State has in effect policies and procedures to
ensure that it meets each of the following conditions: (1) Free appropriate public
education. (A) In general. A free appropriate public education is available to all
children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21,
inclusive, including children with disabilities who have been suspended or
expelled from school."
The explicit language of the provision is much like the statute in Wilder. A distinguishing
characteristic, however, clearly sets it apart: the title of the subsection and each of the conditions
it imposes on the state are in furtherance of providing "Assistance for Education of All Children
with ~isabilities.""~While the language in Wilder merely referenced payment to providers as
one of many conditions to receive funds for the broad "medical assistance" the provision of
FAPE is one of many intended to further the goal of providing an education to all children with
disabilities. Clearly then, Congress used obligation-creating language to further the rights of
children with disabilities to a FAPE.
While looking to the statutory provision to infer an intent to benefit the plaintiff can be
helpful in deciding whether congress intended an enforceable right, the explicit grant of a right to
enforce is even more persuasive. Section 1415 provides clear evidence of Congress's intent to
benefit students with disabilities: "the parents.. .shall have an opportunity for an impartial due
process hearing;""'

and "shall have the right to bring a civil a~tion."''~It would be nonsensical

to grant a right of enforcement to a class of individuals unless those individuals are intended to
benefit h m the rights they can enforce.
Finally, the intent to benefit students with disabilities is evident in the context of the
"'20 U.S.C. $1412(Supp. V 1999).
II3ld. $81415(f)(l).
"'ld. $1415 (i)(Z)(A).
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statute as a whole. The Boren Amendment, which the Court in Wilder held as benefiting the
providers of Medicaid services, was part of a larger statute whose purpose was to provide
medical assistance to indigent

The provision requiring states to provide FAPE to

on the other hand is part of a larger statute the purpose of which
individuals with disabilitie~,"~
is to "ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique
needs and prepare them for employment and independent living."'" The clear focus on
individuals with disabilities as a benefited class similarly buttresses the conclusion that Congress
intended the provision of a FAPE to benefit them.
The second element necessary in determining whether a statutory provision confers a
federal right is whether or not the asserted right is so "vague and amorphous" that its
enforcement would strain judicial competence. In Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and
~ o u s i ~nu~t h o r i t y " ~the
, plaintiffs brought suit to enforce a Housing and Urban Development

(HUD) regulation based upon the Housing Act. The regulation required that the defendant charge
no more for rent than a specified percent of a family's income."9 A "reasonable" allowance for
utilities was included as rent. The defendants responded that a "reasonable" allowance for
utilities was too vague a provision to be an enforceable right. The Supreme Court disagreed
noting that the HUD regulations, which carried the force of law, were sufficiently specific and
definite: they set forth guidelines by which the states should establish utility allowances and they
required a notice and comment period for tenants prior to any change in the allowances.I20 In

115

See,generally, 42 U.S.C.$8 1396a-1396e(1988).

20 U.S.C.$1412(Supp.V 1999).
Id. 5 1400 (d)(l)(A).
'''479u.S. 418 (1987).
'I9 Id.at 420.
I2O Id, at 431-432.
'I6
'I7
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Wilder the Court elaborated to explain that allowing states the flexibility to choose among a

variety of means by which to calculate the allowance did not render the provision so vague that it
couldn't be enforced by a Court. 12'
The requirement that states provide students with disabilities a free and appropriate
public education is not so "vague and amorphous" as to strain judicial competence. First, states
are clearly required to provide a FAPE to students with disabilities. Section 1412 (a)(l)lzz
conditions a states receipt of federal funding under IDEA on that state having policies and
procedures in place to ensure that children are provided a FAPE. Further, section 1413 provides
that a State Educational Agency may not disburse federal funds to any school that fails to ensure
a child is provided their rights under IDEA, including a FAPE.123These provisions are
unambiguous in their requirement that FAPE must be both procedurally and actually provided to
children with disabilities.
Second, the term 'free appropriate public education' is not so vague that a judge would be
unable to enforce the provision. FAPE is defined as: "...special education and related services
that.. .(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and
without charge; (B) meets the standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D)
are provided in conformity with the individualized education program.. ."Iz4 TObe enforceable,
the provision of FAPE must be ascertainable by a judge.'''

A judge may readily ascertain

Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 519-20 (1990).
20 U.S.C. 5 1412 (a)(l) (Supp. V 1999).
lZ3 Id. $1413 (i)(l).
12' Id. $ 1401 (8).
'21 A maxim of administrative regulation is that administrative policies are best left to the administrative bodies
familiar with them. Courts, on the other hand, should only review for compliance with established policy. The
application of this maxim to judicial review of IDEA violations was fust shuck down in Board of Education v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,205 (1982), the fust Supreme Court decision to address the role of the courts in IDEA suits.
According to Rowley, "we think the fact that it Ljudicial reviewlis found in 9 1415, which is entitled 'Procedural
12'
Iz2
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whether a given education is 'free' and 'public'. More difficult to ascertain, however, is whether
that education is appropriate.
The first step a judge may take in determining whether an education is appropriate is to
analyze whether it meets the clear language of the statute. The statutory definition provides that
an appropriate education consists of special education and related services that are developed or
determined necessary as the result of an individualized education program. Additionally, the
educational program created must meet the standards of the State educational agency and extend
to all levels of schooling: Preschool, Elementary, and secondary.lz6 An educational program
failing to meet any of these requirements is clearly not appropriate. It is, however, still possible
for a plan to be 'inappropriate' and yet comply with the procedures outlined in this definition.
An inquiry into what is meant by 'appropriate' cannot be satisfactorily achieved by

relying solely on the statutory definition: The very definition of FAPE relies on the word
'appropriate."27 That IDEA does not define 'appropriate' is no reason to assert that the
provision of a FAPE is 'vague and ambiguous,' however. Had Congress attempted to define
'appropriate,' it would have resulted in an effect other than that which Congress intended in
drafting this statute: a universal approach to the education of students with disabilities as
opposed to an individualized one. The second step in analyzing whether an education is
appropriate, therefore, requires looking at the structure of the statute as a whole in order to
determine what Congress intended by 'appropriate'.
The provisions of the IDEA provide sufficient guidance in determining what the outer
safeguards,' is not without significance" "[we think this]demonstrates the legislative conviction that adequate
compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in
the way of substantive content in an IEP." Even with de novo judicial review that is largely limited to questions of
procedural compliance, "The fact that $ 1415(e) requires that the reviewing cowt 'receive the records of the [state]
administrative proceedings' carries with it the implied requirement that due weight shall be given to these
proceedings." In sum, concerns that judge's are free to create their own educational policy are misplaced.
26 20 U.S.C. 5 1401 (8) (Supp. V 1999).
127
Id. $1401 (8)(C). ("include an appropriate.. .education in the State involved.")
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. is
- an education that both parents and
boundaries of an 'appropriate' education look like128..~t
teachers believe will result in an educational benefit;Iz9It is based on the needs and abilities of a
child as determined by nondiscriminatory testing;I3OIt is goal-oriented and measurable;13' It
includes all necessary services that might enable a child to benefit fiom specially designed
instruction;"* and it may be conducted in the home, a classroom, or other setting.I3' As was true
of the regulations that provided guidance in the state's determination of what constituted
'reasonable' in Wright, the provisions of IDEA provide ample guidance to a judge seeking to
ascertain whether an 'appropriate' education has been
The final element necessary to determine whether a provision confers a federal right is
whether the statute unambiguously imposes a binding obligation upon the state. The Supreme
Court has held spending legislation to be much in the way of a contract: the terms must be
unambiguously stated in order to be enforced."'

In Pennhurst v. H a l d m a n the Supreme Court

found that the Bill of Rights provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act did not unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the state. In making its
determination the Court looked to both the statutory language and the type of legislation it was a
part of. First, noting that the provision in question was merely a 'finding' by Congress and not a
requirement, the Court held that the asserted rights indicated a simple federal preference rather
than a federal mandate.'36 Next, the Court held that the statute did not provide for a withholding

Seegenerally, note 125 supra.
Id. 6 1414(d).
,
''O Id. $ 1414 (b)(3). Students are to be tested using nondiscriminatory or biased devices in order to evaluate the
individual needs and determine appropriate strategies for addressing those needs.
13' Id. $ 1414(d).
Id. $1401 (22).
13' Id. $1401 (25).
479 U.S. 418,431-32 (1987).
I" Pennhu~stState School and Hospital v. Haldennan, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
Id. at 19.
I"

Iz9

.

'"
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of federal monies if the state failed to comply with the Bill of Rights provision.'37A provision in
spending clause legislation that neither confers funds based solely upon compliance or withdraws
funds for the same reason, Pennhurst held, is not 'binding' upon the state. Finally, the Court
noted that the Act's stated purpose was to merely "assist" the states rather than fund the
provision of new substantive rights.I3'
The provision requiring states to provide children with disabilities a fiee and appropriate
education is mandatory rather than precatory. The clear and unambiguous terms of spending
legislation, once federal funding is accepted, are binding upon the state. Unlike Pennhurst, the
provision of federal funding in IDEA is explicitly conditioned upon a state's adoption of a policy
that ensures students with disabilities a free and appropriate edu~ation."~A state cannot easily
claim that the obligation to provide a free, appropriate public education was unknowingly thrust
upon them. The requirement of FAPE is equally unambiguous: the boundaries of what
determine a free and appropriate education, as discussed previously, are readily ascertainable
from the structure of the statute.
The procedural safeguards provisions of the IDEA also make clear that the adoption of a
policy requiring FAPE is mandatory. Should a child not receive a FAPE, their parent or
guardian may seek administrative and judicial redress through the statutorily mandated
procedures. Further, the HCPA amendment specifically provides that students and parents with
disabilities will not be limited in the remedies they might seek as a result of the

IDEA.'^'

Clearly, the requirement of FAPE is mandatory and binding upon states that choose to accept

137

Id. at 16-18.
Id. at 18.
139 20 U.S.C. $ 1412(1), 1412(2)(B) (Supp. V 1999).
140
Id. $ I415 (1) ("Nothing in this title shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies
available under the Constihltion, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, title v of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities.")
13*
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federal funds under the IDEA.
Once a plaintiff has demonstrated that the statutory provision in question meets the three
requirements of the

lessi in^ testI4', a presumption exists that $1983 is available to them. This

presumption may only be rebutted by a showing that Congress, in fact, intended to foreclose
access to $1983. Courts can determine Congressional intent to foreclose a remedy under $ 1983
either "expressly, by forbidding recourse to $ 1983 in the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating
a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under $

1983."142Congress has only found statutoryprovisions to be so comprehensive as to foreclose
access to $1983 in two cases: Sea Clammers and Smith v. ~obinson.'~'
The Court in Smith found two factors to be relevant in holding that Congress had sought
to foreclose a plaintiffs access to $1983 when the underlying violation was one that fell within
the ambit of rights provided under the IDEA. First, the Court found that the Act provided a
carefully tailored means of administrative review that included access to a judicial proceeding
upon exhaustion of these initial remedial means.'" Second, the Court noted that a petitioner
could by-pass these initial administrative means by claiming a Constitutional violation of a right
enforceable through the IDEA and initiating a suit under $ 1 9 8 3 . ' ~ ~
The Court in Sea Clammers similarly found access to $1983 to have been foreclosed by
comprehensive enforcement mechanisms. The Court found that the remedial devices available
through the statutes at issue would be by-passed if use of $1983 was permitted.'46 When specific
remedies were provided for in the statute and a claim for damages was not one of them, the
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,340-341 (1997).
Id. at 341.
' 4 3 See Part 111, inta.
IM 468 U.S. 992.1011 (US. 1984).
'41 Id. at 1012-13.
la 453 U.S. 1,20 (1981) ("It is hard to believe that congress intended to preserve the $1983 right of action when it
created so many specific statutory remedies")
"I
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Court in Sea Clammers held that a separate suit for damages under $1983 was not what Congress
intended.14' A savings clause in one of the statutes specified that the injunctive relief provided
therein was not to be construed as preventing any other relief under "any other statute." This
clause, Justices Stevens and Blackmun noted in dissent, should be construed as including access
to $1983.'~' The majority Court, however, held that "any other statute" does not include $1983
since the underlying claim would still be based on the statute within which the savings claim was

Congress did not intend to foreclose a plaintiffs access to $1983 for purposes of suing
for a violation of IDEA. Although courts may rely on the comprehensiveness of the remedies
provided in a statute in determining whether Congress intended to foreclose access to $ 1983, this
reliance is only justified if Congress has not clearly spoken. In amending the IDEA, Congress
clearly sought to reverse the Supreme Court's holding that $1983 may not me used to address
violations of the IDEA:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights,
procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, title V of the
Rehabilitation Act, or other Federal statutes protecting the rights of
handicapped children and youth, except that before the filing of a civil
action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this part,
the procedures under subsection (b)(2) and (c) shall be exhausted to the
same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this
part.'50
The legislative history of the Handicapped Children's Protection Act buttresses the
conclusion that Congress, in amending the IDEA, intended to make clear that individuals with
disabilities should have access to $1983 for violations of IDEA. In noting the above provision, a
Joint Explanatory Statement clarifies, "[Bloth the Senate bill and the House amendment
Id.
Id. at 29.
'"ld. at21.

'41

Is0

PLB. L. NO. 99-372,s 2, 100 Stat. 796 (1986). (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 1415 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
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authorize the filing of civil actions under legal authorities other than part B of the EHA to the
same extent as would be required under that part.. . It is the conferees intent that actions brought
under 42 U.S.C. 1983 are governed by this provision.'"'

Further, Congress stated that this

amendment was designed to "reestablish statutory rights repealed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Smith v. Robinson" and to ''reaffirm, in light of this decision, the viability of Section 504,42

U.S.C. 1983, and other statutes as separate vehicles for ensuring the rights of handicapped
children."'52 When Congress speaks with a clear voice, there is no need to infer intent. The
clear language of the HCPA amendment and its legislative history make clear that Congress did
not intend to withdraw a plaintiffs access to $1983 when it enacted the IDEA.

V.

Critique of the Circuit Split

Section 1983 is available to plaintiffs suing for violations of the IDEA. Circuit courts
that explicitly hold otherwise have incorrectly reasoned that Congress intended to foreclose
access to $1983 by providing an elaborate administrative procedure that allows for redress.
The Fourth and Tenth Circuits have held $ 1983 to be foreclosed based upon four
findings: (1) The procedures and remedies available under the IDEA are so comprehensive as to
indicate an intent by congress to preclude enforcement by way of $1983; (2) The 1985
amendment to IDEA did not preserve the use of $1983; (3) If legislative history might be
construed as preserving access to $1983, such a construction is solely limited to access of $1983
for violations of Constitutional rights; and (4) that the ambiguity regarding the availability of
$1983 in the HCPA precludes its enforcement against the states.Is3 These findings are incorrect.

In determining that Congress intended to foreclose access to $1983 for statutory
violations of the IDEA by providing a comprehensive, administrative scheme, the Fourth and
H.R. CONF.REP. 99-687 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N., 1807, 1809.
H.R. REP. NO. 99-296 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.,1798, 1799-1800.
''3~ellers,141 F.3d 524,530-31 (loLhCir.1998).
''I

'"

Page 29 of 44

Tenth Circuits chose to discount the actual wishes of Congress as expressed in the HCPA. When
a court has established that a statute creates enforceable rights, a rebuttable presumption of the
availability of $1983 arises.154Courts need only look beyond this presumption when it is not
clear whether Congress intended to foreclose access to $1983. The Court in Smith acknowledged
this cannon of interpretation when it noted that it would have found $1983 to be an available
remedy if Congress had "specifically indicated that it did not intend to limit the judicial remedies
otherwise available to a handicapped

The HCPA amendment, in response to Smith,

provides, "Nothing in this title shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures and
remedies available under ...federal statutes protecting the rights of handicapped children.. .9,156
The Fourth and Tenth Circuits chose to look beyond Congress' clear response to Smith,
however, and have instead held that Congress failed to preserve the use of $1983 by not
expressly providing for it in the HCPA.'" Relying upon the fact that the amendment expressly
provides for the preservation of rights remedies and procedures under the Constitution, the
Rehabilitation Act, and "other Federal statutes protecting the rights of handicapped
children ..."lS8

the Fourth and Tenth Circuits find the absence of $1983 to be telling. Further,

they note that "other statutes protecting the rights of disabled children cannot naturally be read to
include 42 U.S.C. $ 1983, a statute which speaks generally, and mentions neither disability nor
youth."'s9 This reasoning is faulty in several respects.
First, requiring Congress to afirmatively provide for $1983 is to "invert the established
presumption that a private remedy is available under 5 1983 unless Congress has affirmatively

IS4

Blessing, 520 U.S. 329,341 (1997).
Smith, 468 U.S. 992, 1013, n.16 (1984).
IS6
PUB. L. NO. 99-372,s 2,100 Stat. 796 (1986). (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 1415 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
1s7~ellers,
141 F.3d 524,530 (4IhCi. 1998); Padilla, 233 F.3d 1268, 13 (10' Cir. 2000).
158 r#i
"I Sellers, 141 F.3d 524,530 (4" Cir. 1998).
Is'

....
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withdrawn the remedy."'60 Second, even though Congress need not affirmatively provide for the
use of $1983, the HCPA does in fact provide for $1983 when it affirms the availability of "other
Federal statutes"I6' that protect the rights of children with disabilities. Congress, in specifying
the Constitution and the Rehabilitation Act, was merely listing sources that confer enforceable
rights to children with disabilities. To include $ 1983 in this grouping, a statute conferring no
substantive rights, would have been anomalous. Instead, Congress concluded the sentence with
the disjunctive 'or'162 followed by "other Federal statutes protecting the rights of handicapped
children and youth.. ."I6' Section 1983, a statute created to protect and enforce civil rights,
clearly matches this description. This assertion is bolstered by the 1997 amendment to the IDEA
where Congress amended its list of rights-creating sources to include the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). Had Congress meant to merely encompass other rights-creating statutes
when it presewed "other Federal statutes", the addition of the ADA would have been mere
surplussage.
Next, the Fourth and Tenth Circuits assert that the legislative history of the HCPA
amendment is consistent with their interpretation that $1983 is not available for statutory
violations of the IDEA. House Conference Report 99-687 provides, "It is the conferees' intent
that actions brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 are governed by this provision."'64 Rather than
construing this statement in its most natural fashion, the Tenth and Fourth Circuits have unduly
limited the legislative history to comport with their interpretation of the HCPA amendment: that
any reference to $1983 could only refer to an intent by Congress to preserve a plaintiffs access
Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347,376 (1992). Internal citations omitted.
PUB.L. NO. 99-372,G 2,100 Stat. 796 (1986). (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 1415 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
162
Sellers, 141 F.3d 524,530 (4' Cir. 1998).The Sellers Court, in analyzing the HCPA amendment, fails to note the
importance of the disjunctive connecting the sources conferring federal rights and "other" statutes, incorrectly
phrasing the analysis as follows, "But while section 1415(f) explicitly preserves remedies under the Constitution, the
Rehabilitation Act, and specified "other" statutes, it simply fails to mention Section 1983." (emphasis added).
16'

163 Id

I64

H.R. CONF.
REP.NO. 99-687, at 7 (1986), reprintedin 1986U.S.C.C.A.N.1807,1809.
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to the rights and remedies of the Constitution, not as a vehicle for remedying statutory violations
of the IDEA. The Circuit courts' narrowing of the clear conference report statement is not
supported by either the legislative history or the statutory language; the opinions of the circuits
similarly fail to provide support for their narrowing of the conferees' clear statement. Such
unsupported opinions should be entitled to little, if any, weight.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit points to Pennhurst's clear statement rule to support its
holding that $1983 is not available to plaintiffs suing for statutory violations of the IDEA.
Pennhurst requires obligations that are imposed pursuant to the spending power to be
The Fourth Circuit, finding the language
unambiguously stated in order to be held enfor~eab1e.I~~
of HCPA to be ambiguous in its response to Smith, construed this holding to likewise prevent the
use of $1983 in suits based upon statutory violations of IDEA. A crucial difference that the
Fourth circuit overlooks, however, is that the issue in Pennhurst was whether an implied right of
action might be found to enforce alleged rights that were phrased in precatory rather than
mandatory terms. Second, even had the language of HCPA not been plain, the issue in
Pennhurst is quite distinguishable from that in the debate of whether $1983 is available for
statutory violations: Pennhurst concerns the grave issue of holding a state responsible for
ensuring an ambiguously imposed substantive right after that state has unwittingly agreed to
accept federal funding in exchange for fulfilling the obligations laid out in the federal statute.
Quite differently, whether or not $1983 is available to plaintiffs is not purely an issue of whether
substantive rights exist, but rather whether rights plainly set forth in the statute may be enforced
by application of a civil rights statute. Additionally, as the application of $1983 to federal laws
commenced prior to the implementation of

IDEA,'^^ it is unlikely that a state can claim that it

~ennhurst,451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,2 (1980).
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lacked notice of the enforceability of substantive federal rights by means of $1983 when it
accepted federal funding.
Still, the Fourth Circuit claims that it is Congress's duty to affirmatively set forth a
plaintiffs right to use $1983 since the Court in Smith ruled that other laws were not available to
plaintiffs who had claims that might properly be addressed by the remedies set forth in the
IDEA. Even had the holdings of Pennhurst been applicable to the issue of whether $1983 is
available, the intent of Congress to allow suits for statutory violations of the IDEA under $1983
is clear. As discussed previously, HCPA's use of a disjunctive between the sources from which
an enforceable right can be found and the statutes that merely serve to protect those substantive
rights clearly indicates Congressional intent to allow the use of $1983.

VI.

What Gonzaga v. Doe Adds

A relatively recent Supreme Court case, Gonzaga v. Doe, has the potential to shift the
foregoing conception of the IDEA and its relation to $1983 claims. John Doe, the plaintiff in

Gonzaga v. Doe, was a graduating student in the college of education at Gonzaga University.
Upon graduating from Gonzaga, Doe intended to teach at an elementary school in Washington.

In order to obtain certification to teach in Washington, Doe was required to provide an affidavit
from his graduating school that attested to his good moral character. One of the defendants,
Roberta League, held the position of certification specialist at John Doe's college. League
learned from another student that Doe had engaged in sexual misconduct with another student.
Upon further investigation, the defendant decided that she would not grant Doe the required
affidavit. The defendant then proceeded to call the state certification agency, identify the plaintiff
by name, and discuss the allegations that prompted her decision with the agency. Doe brought
suit under $1983 against the University and League, alleging that the defendants acted in

Page 33 of 44

violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) by releasing his
educational information without his or his parents' consent.I6'
The Washington trial court, following half of the circuit courts, found in favor of Doe and
awarded relief based upon Doe's $1983 claim. The Washington Court of Appeals, however,
chose to follow the other half of the circuits in regard to whether FEWA granted rights
enforceable by way of $1983, and reversed the trial court decision.16' The Washington Supreme
Court, in turn, reversed the appellate court finding, noting that while FERPA as a whole does not
create enforceable rights, the FERPA provision relied upon by the plaintiff was amenable to
enforcement under $1983. Noting both the conflict in the circuits regarding whether $1983 was
available to causes of action based on violations of FEWA as well as the ambiguity of its own
previous $1983 decisions, the Supreme Court granted certiora~i.'~~
a. Holdings of Gonzaga

Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the plaintiffs assertion that the
FERPA provision at issue'70 conferred individually enforceable rights. The Chief Justice made
three key findings in reaching this decision. First, he noted that the Court has only rarely found
spending clause legislation to confer enforceable rights.I7' Second, the Chief Justice held that in
order to bring an action under 5 1983, Congress must have unambiguously intended to provide
the plaintiff with an enforceable right.ln Third, and relatedly, the Chief Justice held that the
inquiry used to determine whether an enforceable right exists in an implied right of action suit

16'

536 U.S 273,276 (2002) (relaying the facts of the case).
Id. at 278.

lS9 .
Id.
...

Irn 20 U.S.C. $1232g(b)(l). 'Wo funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational
agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the releaseof education records (or personally
identifiable information contained therein...) of students without the written consent of their parents to any
individual, agency or organization."
171
Conraga, 536 U.S. 273,280.
Id. at 283.
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should also be used to determine whether a plaintiff may sue under $1983.'~'
Chief Justice Rehnquist began by noting that only twice since Pennhurst had the Court
found spending clause legislation to give rise to enforceable rights.'74 Distinguishing those
provisions which gave rise to enforceable rights in Wilder and Wright from the provision in
FERPA, the Chief Justice noted that the former explicitly conferred monetary entitlements upon
the plaintiffs'7' while the latter merely stated a condition that the Secretary of Education was
obligated to enf~rce.'~~-~dditionall~,
the Chief Justice noted that in its more recent decisions,
those of Suter and Blessing, the Court had "rejected attempts to infer enforceable rights from
Spending Clause statutes."'77 Emphasizing the restrictive holdings of Pennhurst and Suter, Chief
Justice Rehnquist reiterated that Congress must unambiguously confer an individual right, not
merely provide the Secretary with a standard by which to measure a state's compliance.'78
The Chief Justice next responded to the plaintiffs argument that prior Supreme Court
decisions had found rights enforceable by $1983 when Congress had simply demonstrated an
intent to benefit the plaintiff. 17' Admitting that past opinions might suggest that "something less
~ Justice Rehnquist
than an unambiguously conferred right is enforceable by $ 1 9 8 3 , " ' ~Chief

'"Id.; If a wurt fmds a stahlte to create an implied right of action, a plaintiff may sue for violations of that statute
despite being granted no express right of action. The test for determining whether an implied right of an action may
be found was most succinctly stated in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,78 (1975): "First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,' - that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to
deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for
the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
This test was modified in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,286 (2001)(citations ommited) to also require that
Congress "display[ ] an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy." Application of the implied
ri hts inquiry to the $ 1983 inquiry significantly raises the bar on what plaintiffs must prove to establish standing.
1 3 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273,280.
Id. at 280.
I" Id. at 279.
Id. at 281.
17' Id. at 281.
'19 Id. at 282.
Id. at 320.
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stated that the Court "now reject[s] the notion that our cases permit anyhng short of an
unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under $1983."'8'
Further responding to the plaintiffs concerns that a "more 'rigorous' inquiry would
conflate the standard for inferring a private right of action under $ 1983 with the standard for
infemng a private right of action from the statute itse~f,""~Chief Justice Rehnquist held that
"our implied right of action cases should guide the determination of whether a statute confers
rights enforceable under $1983."1s3As a result, he continued, the tests for determining whether a
private right of action can be implied and whether a statutory violation may be enforced through
$1983 "overlap in one meaningful respect - in either case we must first determine whether
Congress intended to create a federal right."lp4
Analyzing the FERPA statute under the clear and unambiguous standard articulated by
the Chief Justice, the majority found that the provision created state obligations to an aggregate
of its citizens and did not contain the individual rights-creating language required to support an
action under $1983.'*' Further, it noted that FERPA explicitly authorized the Secretary of
Education to enforce the statute and that the Secretary, in turn, created an office to investigate
. I ~ ~administrative procedures, the Court held, "squarely distinguish
individual ~ o r n ~ 1 a i n t sSuch
this case fiom Wright and Wilder where an aggrieved individual lacked any federal review
mechanism.. .and further counsel against our finding congressional intent to create individually
enforceable private rights."18'
Concumng in the judgment but questioning the majority's textual emphasis was Justices
Id. at 321.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 32 1 .
Id.
''' Id. at 287.
Id. at 289.
18' Id. at 290.
''I
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Breyer and Souter. Breyer found that the broad language of the FERPA provision provided too
little guidance to schools about the nature of their obligations to be considered enforceab~e.'~~
He
agreed with the majority that an evaluation of multiple factors, as expressed in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion, pointed to a lack of intent by Congress to allow private enforcement
a ~ t i 0 n s .Justice
l ~ ~ Breyer disagreed, however, with the majority's reliance on, what he
characterized to be a purely textual test to determine congressional intent: "I would not, in effect,
pre-determine an outcome through the use of a presumption - such as the majority's presumption
that a right is conferred only if set forth 'unambiguously' in the statute's 'text and stru~ture.""~
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsberg joins, wrote a two part dissenting opinion.

In part one, Justice Stevens analyzes the FERPA provision according to the three part test
articulated in Blessing v. Freestone and finds that it creates an enforceable right. In part two
Justice Stevens questions the majority's decision to import the implied right of action inquiry
into the $1983 analysis.
Justice Stevens first breaks from the majority in deciding how to analyze the provision at
issue. While the majority focused solely on the provision at issue, Justice Stevens notes that a
'blanket approach' to questions of enforceability by $1983 is not

Instead, he

draws his findings from reading the provision in light of the entire statute. Justice Stevens
quickly finds the majority's assertion that FERPA "'entirely lacks" rights-creating language"'92
to be erroneous. On the contrary, the statute is replete with specific references to 'rights.' Justice
Stevens next takes issue with the majority's findings that the provision speaks only to an

Id. at 292.
id.
Id.at 29 1 .
19' Id. at 294.
192 Id. at 296.
Is8
IS9
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aggregate and cannot, therefore, convey individual rights.I9' By focusing on the contingent
phrase "so long as" in the statutory provision, Justice Stevens finds that $1232g(b) doesn't
simply outright ban a practice, rather it conditions a practice on an individual student's parents
action.'94 Because it is the individual student's parents who must perform the action, Justice
Stevens finds the provision to be individually focused. Even were it not, however, Stevens
asserts that the simple fact that a provision conditions relief on apolicy or practice is not
preclusive of an individual right to enf~rcement.'~'
Turning to the factors outlined in the Blessing test, Justice Stevens notes that the right at
issue in FERPA "plainly meets the standards we articulated.. .for establishing a federal right."'96
Additionally, Stevens notes, the right claimed in the FERPA provision is even more clear and
unambiguous than those rights held to be enforceable by $1983 in both Wright and WiIder.I9'
Stevens finishes his $1983 analysis by examining FERPA to determine whether Congress
intended to specifically withdraw the remedy of $1983. Holding that Congress demonstrated no
such intent, he first concludes that FERPA creates a privately enforceable right and then directs
his attention to the $1983 analysis employed by the majority.
In part two of the dissent, Justice Stevens criticizes the majority's importation of the
implied right of action inquiry into the $1983 context. First, he observes that the separation of
powers concerns that warrant a more searching review of whether Congress intended to create a
privately enforceable right are not present in the $1983 context.19*While implied right of action
cases "reflect a concern. ..that Congress rather than the courts control the availability of remedies

'93 Id.

at 295.

Id.
19= Id.
'%Id.at 295.
19' Id. at 295.
'"Id. at 300.
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for violations of statutes,"'99 the fact that Congress specifically authorized private actions in
enacting $1983 alleviates the Court of that concern.
Justice Stevens next notes that the use of implied right of action precedent in the $1983
context results in the new requirement that Congress must specifically intend to make the right
~ ~is unavoidable, Justice Stevens contends, given that past
enforceable under $ 1 9 8 3 . ~This

implied rights decisions "do not necessarily cleanly separate out the 'right' question from the
'cause of action' question."201Such a new requirement, he adds, conflicts directly with the
established presumption that $1983 is available to all plaintiffs filing suit for violation of a
federal right202
In conclusion, Stevens observes that the Court's decision to meld the 'is there a right'
inquiry with the 'is it enforceable' inquiry, as demonstrated in its question of whether "Congress
nonetheless intended private suits to be brought.. .rr 203 and its reliance on implied right of action
decisions, places an unwarranted higher burden on the plaintiff
b. Implicationsfor the Circuit Split

The Gonzaga decision may greatly affect the way $1983 claims based on violations of
the IDEA are decided. Circuits that have found $1983 to be available to plaintiffs suing for
violations of the IDEA have based their decision on the 1986 amendment to the IDEA and its
legislative history. Circuits ruling against the use of $1983 for statutory violations of the IDEA
hold that the amendment doesn't explicitly reference $1983 and that any discussion regarding
$1983 in the legislative history pertains only to the pursuit of Constitutional claims that mir~or

those that might be brought under the IDEA. Both sides of the debate have primarily analyzed
199 Id.
'"1d. at301.
201
Id. at 301.
Id. at 302.
m3 Id.
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the availability of $1983 under the second part of the $1983 inquiry: whether or not Congress
foreclosed the use of $1983. The decision in Gonzaga, however, may prompt courts to begin
analyzing $1983 claims based upon the IDEA under the newly modified first part of the $1983
inquiry: whether Congress unambiguously conferred a "right to support a cause of action
brought under $1983."~'~
Courts that have analyzed whether $1983 is available for claims based upon statutory
violations of the IDEA have not analyzed whether the statutory provision at issue conveys
enforceable rights. It is likely that a majority of these courts have relied upon the Supreme
Court's statement in Smith, that "the Act establishes an enforceable substantive right to a free
appropriate public education required by the stat~te,"~'' to be conclusive as to whether IDEA
creates an enforceable right to a FAPE."~ AS the dissent in Gonzaga noted, however, the
majority's conflation of the implied right of action inquiry with the $ 1983 inquiry sub silentio
overrules cases such as Wilder and Wright where the provisions at issue, like the provisions in
the IDEA, "did not 'clearly and unambiguously' ...intend enforceability under $1983."207
The majority opinion in Gonzaga announced that "Since Pennhurst, only twice have we
found spending legislation to give rise to enforceable rights."208The two decisions the Court then
cites does not include Smith v. Robinson among them. If Pennhurst was decided three year
before Smith and yet Smith is not included in the Supreme Court's exceptions, it seems safe to
conclude that the Supreme Court does not consider itself to have held the IDEA, a statute created
pursuant Congress' spending power, to have given rise to enforceable rights. The Supreme Court

id. at 283.
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992,1010 (1984).
2W
As noted earlier, a majority of the federal court cases filed allege violations of a FAPE.
207
Gonzaga, 536 U.S.273,300 (2002)(emphasis in original).
id. at 280 (2002).
'
M
'O5
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"is bound by holdings, not language"209and "questions which merely lurk in the record, neither
brought to the attention of the Court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so
decided as to constitute

If Smith did not hold the IDEA to create substantive

enforceable rights in the $1983 context and the test for determining whether an enforceable right
exists has changed with the advent of Gonzaga, it appears likely that the Supreme Court, and
lower courts, can evaluate anew whether the IDEA's provisions confer enforceable rights.
Many of the IDEA'S most litigated provisions are troublingly similar to those in the
disputed FERPA provision.2" The FERF'A provision at issue in Gonzaga conditions federal
funding upon a finding that the educational agency does not have a "policy or practice of
permitting the release of education records of students.. ."2'2 Similarly, the IDEA conditions
funding upon a finding that the state has in effect "policies and procedures" to ensure that it
meets each of the following conditions: ...[ a] Free Appropriate Public

ducati ion."^'^

Also

similar to the FERF'A provision at issue in Gonzaga, the majority of the IDEA's provisions lack
the clear rights-creating language that the majority in Gonzaga held to be key in finding rights to
be enforceable under $1983. If, as Justice Breyer contends, the majority opinion requires the text
and structure of the statute to squarely provide the plaintiff with an enforceable right, only
$1415, a provision that allows suit based upon the violation a student's right to a FAPE, may be
able to pass the Gonzaga test. Evaluated as part of spending clause legislation, however, this
lone provision may equally be jeopardized as the result of Gonzaga.
The majority in Gonzaga takes pains to emphasize that statutes passed pursuant to

Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,282 (2001).
Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507,511 (1925).
2" See, e.g., notes 187 and 188 infra.
212
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273,279 (2002).
'"42 U.S.C. 9 1412 (a) (2003).
209
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Congress' spending power are especially disfavored in the $1983 context.214The IDEA, like
FERPA, is a spending clause statute. The majority in Gonzaga stresses that the two suits that
have been allowed since Pennhurst, both of which were premised on violations of spending
clause statutes, were only allowed because "Congress spoke in terms that 'could not be
clearer."'21s Responding to the plaintiffs assertion that "this line of ~ases"~"
establishes a
federal right as long as Congress intended that the statute benefit the plaintiff, the Supreme
Court, states that, "we now reject the notion that our cases permit anything short of an
unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under $1983."'"

This

heightened requirement, that a statute must expressly state a right to a cause of action under $
1983, is not expressed in any other context in the remainder of the Court's opinion.
One interpretation that can be drawn fiom this statement might be that it applies only to
the type of cases being discussed in that particular section of the provision--Spending Clause
legislation. If hue, spending legislation, perhaps because it "is much in the nature of a

on tract,""^ must expressly state that $ 1983 is available to plaintiffs filing suit upon these
statutes. No clause in the IDEA, including $1415, expressly states that $ 1983 is available to
plaintiffs suing for violations of the IDEA.
Prior to Gonzaga, the majority of the circuits held that $ 1983 was available to plaintiffs
seeking redress for violations of the IDEA. The two circuits that clearly opposed such a finding,
the Tenth and Fourth, based their decisions on a misinterpretation of the statutory language

214

See, e.g. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273,279-281 (2002). ("Since Pennhurst only twice have we found spending
legislation to give rise to enforceable rights" and "Our most recent decisions, however, have rejected attempts to
infer enforceable rights fiom Spending Clause statutes.")
'I5 Id. at 280 (2002).
2'6 Id. at 282.(refe-g
to $1983 decisions of rights alleged in spending clause statutes)
'"1d. at 283.
218
Pennhurst State School &Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). (refusing to fmd an enforceable right
where the alleged right was not clear enough to be enforced as part of a contract). The Supreme Court, however did
not explain its reasoning in Gonzaga.
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contained in the HCPA. Upon a broad reading of Gonzaga, however, the Tenth and Fourth
circuits may now successfi~llyshift their analysis to the first part of the 5 1983 inquiry and
continue to hold that § 1983 is not available for statutory violations of the IDEA. Gonzaga, in
sum, has great potential to reverse the current circuit court split over whether 5 1983 is available.
VII.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's decision in Gonzaga has the potential to prevent parents of students
with disabilities from suing under § 1983 for violations of the IDEA. In the absence of 3 1983,
parents and students will be forced to rely upon the administrative procedures2'9and remedieszz0
provided by local and state educational agencies. Although the federal government may withhold
federal hnding for violations of the IDEA, the severity of this remedy and the consequences it
has on the intended beneficiaries of the statute, will likely prevents its use.
Congress is, of course, at liberty to amend the IDEA to clarify that 5 1983 is available to
plaintiffs. Requiring Congress to specifically provide for 3 1983 does little, however, except to
delay the ability of parents and children whose rights have been violated to obtain the
appropriate relief they deserve and make Congress take additional, needless steps to reaffirm its
original intent. It does not better enable states to make informed decisions when evaluating
spending legislation because states accept Spending Clause legislation against the backdrop of 5
1983.'~' It does not further the goal of preventing federal commandeering of the states by way of
private suits for money damages;222the IDEA explicitly requires exhaustion of state

Individuals who are not made aware of their right to the administrative remedies under the IDEA until after those
remedies are no longer sufficient or available will, however, have no means of redress.
220
If the current case law does not provide an adequate remedy, however, parents and students will be left without
redress.
22' Pennhurst, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation."
222
See generally. Michael S. Greve, Business. The States, and Federalism's Political Economy, 25 HARV.
J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 895,913 (2002) ("When the average mayor or governor thinks of 'commandeering,' what comes to his
2'9
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administrative procedures. Finally, it does not further separation of powers concerns since
Congress crafts legislation against the backdrop of $ 1983. The only thing that it may do quite
well is alleviate the burden currently placed on courts to determine whether every provision of
every statute confers an enforceable right. It is not immediately apparent, however, that the
convenience enjoyed by the courts will be enough to outweigh the intermediate harm suffered by
plaintiffs suing, without adequate remedy, for violations of Spending Clause statutes.

mind is not the rare direct federal intervention of the sort at issue in New York v. United States and Printz v. U ~ t e d
States but rather a private lawsuit under $ 1983.")
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